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STATE EXTRATERRITORIAL POWERS
RECONSIDERED: A REPLY
Katherine Florey*
INTRODUCTION
I greatly appreciate Professor Rosen's thoughtful reply' to my
recent article. 2 In many ways, our differences on extraterritoriality
doctrine and practice are modest. We agree that current doctrine has
its flaws; we agree that courts are useful "first cut" actors in formulat-
ing responses to extraterritoriality disputes;3 and we agree that the
system functions as harmoniously as it does because states, for the
most part, have chosen to regulate in a way that respects their neigh-
bors' territorial prerogatives.4
I respond to Professor Rosen primarily to clarify what I take to be
our principal area of disagreement: that is, whether current doctrine
reflects meaningful and coherent policy choices (such as a decision to
recognize multiple constitutional values) or, instead, whether it is bet-
ter described as a haphazard assemblage of sometimes-inconsistent
principles that courts have failed to justify or reconcile to any mean-
ingful degree. I argue, of course, for the latter view-and it is my
@ 2010 Katherine Florey. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Acting Professor of Law, University of California at Davis.
1 Mark D. Rosen, State Extraterritorial Powers Reconsidered, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1133 (2010).
2 Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the Extra-
territoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1057
(2009).
3 See Rosen, supra note 1, at 1151.
4 I take no issue, for example, with Rosen's observations that the present extra-
territoriality problem is "far from a crisis." Rosen, supra note 1, at 1135. It is
undoubtedly the case that, even in the absence of clear doctrinal standards, states'
good faith-not to mention their self-interest-have in most circumstances operated
to reduce substantially potential areas of regulatory conflict. Yet the fact that any
extraterritoriality problem states currently face is far more modest than it might be
does not mean that there is no reason to address it.
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skepticism of the current doctrinal regime, more than my belief in a
single doctrinal standard for its own sake, that leads me to argue for a
reconsideration of the approach courts take to extraterritoriality
problems.
I. LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK
At the moment, we have (at least) two standards for assessing the
extraterritorial effect of state regulation.5 On the one hand, state leg-
islation affecting commerce is purportedly governed by the Edgar/
Healy dormant Commerce Clause standard (itself something of ajum-
ble of standards, possibly prohibiting both regulation of wholly out-of-
state conduct and regulation that creates the danger of "inconsistent
legislation"6 ). On the other, the decision of a state court to apply
state law to a given dispute (whether commercial in nature or not) is
governed by the Hague "aggregation of contacts" standard, apparently
rooted in both the Due Process and the Full Faith and Credit
Clauses.7 Both of these standards are themselves unsatisfactory; they
can be rightfully criticized for their unclear scope (in the case of the
Edgar/Healy test) and (in the case of the Hague test) their toothless-
ness and their slighting of full faith and credit concerns. As a result,
they simply do not-jointly or individually-supply courts with a use-
ful way of thinking about extraterritoriality problems. But perhaps
even more troublingly, the existence of these two tests rests on a dis-
tinction between regulation by state legislatures and application of
state law by state courts that simply cannot be maintained or justified.8
5 Rosen quite rightly points out that other constitutional provisions, such as the
right to travel or the dual sovereignty "sub-doctrine" Double Jeopardy Clause, func-
tion at least in part to ensure that states do not overstep their territorial boundaries in
specific circumstances. Rosen, supra note 1, at 1137. These provisions, however,
apply in narrow, clearly delineated circumstances (respectively, permitting second
state criminal prosecutions and (arguably) limiting states' right to regulate the con-
duct of their citizens out of state) and thus, have only modest relevance to the more
general problem of extraterritorial regulation. (Rosen also mentions the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, but full faith and credit concerns could easily be incorporated into
any unified extraterritoriality standard, just as they are nominally (if perhaps unsatis-
factorily) taken into account in the Hague regime. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449
U.S. 302, 308 n.10 (1981) (plurality opinion)).
6 See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 337 (1989); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624, 642 (1982) (plurality opinion).
7 See Hague, 449 U.S. at 308 (plurality opinion).
8 To be sure, this distinction has already broken down in a variety of contexts.
For example, in striking down courts' awards of punitive damages for out-of-state con-
duct, the Court's reasoning has appeared to draw on both the Edgar and Hague tradi-
tions. See Florey, supra note 2, at 1097.
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A New York regulation that purports to apply New York standards to
out-of-state conduct is, in most respects, functionally indistinguishable
from the decision of a New York court to enjoin the defendant from
engaging in behavior in another state that violates New York law. Yet
our existing case law would apply sharply divergent standards in assess-
ing each act's constitutionality.
Professor Rosen likewise sees deficiencies in current case law.9
But he defends the current regime on the grounds that two (or, he
would argue, more) extraterritoriality standards are not only
unproblematic but also desirable. In Rosen's view, multiple standards
are called for, first, because multiple constitutional provisions poten-
tially speak to the extraterritoriality problem 0 and, second, because
an act of extraterritorial regulation may in fact affect the disparate
interests of "individuals, . . . states, and . . . the interstate federal
system.""
Fair enough. A coherent extraterritoriality standard should in
fact take account of all these interests. While such a standard should
integrate the disparate strands of current doctrine, it need not be
monolithic. It could, for example, provide for the application of vary-
ing levels of scrutiny where meaningful distinctions are present, the
most important one being whether the state is attempting to regulate
commercial or noncommercial conduct.' 2 The current standards,
however, are simply imperfectly tailored to protect any of these inter-
ests. The Hague standard, for example, nominally rests on the Due
Process Clause-but it is a spectacularly inadequate safeguard for
shielding individuals from overreaching states because it adds virtually
nothing to the protections already conferred by personal jurisdiction
doctrine.13 By contrast, the Edgar/Healy standards, if applied literally,
have the potential to invalidate such a wide swath of state legislation
that many commentators have concluded that the Court cannot possi-
bly be taken at its word in those cases.14 Such vague and shifting stan-
dards cannot operate as meaningful safeguards of multiple
constitutional interests; rather, they simply foster confusion and
uncertainty.
9 See Rosen, supra note 1, at 1135 (noting that "the status quo is not ideal").
10 Id. at 1136-37.
11 Id.
12 See Florey, supra note 2, at 1119.
13 See id. at 1127.
14 See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 806 (2001); Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and
Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REv. 1468, 1521-22 (2007).
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A second reason to reject the application of multiple, wholly sepa-
rate standards is that there is a good deal of overlap among all three
interests (individual due process, state sovereignty, and federalism)
that Rosen identifies. If a Minnesotan is subjected to onerous regula-
tion by the state of Illinois, Illinois's act is likely to offend the Minne-
sotan's due process interests, Minnesota's domestic authority in a
wider sense, and the harmonious functioning of the interstate system
in equal measure. Certainly it may be possible to conceive of exam-
ples where these three interests are implicated to slightly different
degrees, but since any egregious act of extraterritorial regulation is
likely to affect all of them, a single extraterritoriality framework is
likely to be at least serviceable in defending all three.
Moreover, advocating the use of particular extraterritorial princi-
ples to protect discrete constitutional interests assumes that judges
apply such principles with care and deliberation. That, to say the
least, is not always the case. Rather, courts have in many situations
elected simply to pick and choose, often rather arbitrarily, from the
increasingly garbled menu of extraterritoriality options available.
This has led to results that are often sweeping and unpredictable.
Consider, for example, American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki,15 in which a
federal district court forcefully revived-and indeed extended-the
Edgar! Healy line of cases in striking down a New York statute criminal-
izing computer-to-computer transmission of pornography to a
minor.'6 In so doing, the court expressed skepticism of all state regu-
lation of the Internet, noting that "state regulation of those aspects of
commerce that by their unique nature demand cohesive national
treatment is offensive to the Commerce Clause."1 7 While Pataki's rea-
soning has been far from universally embraced,18 the case highlights
the ways in which the uncertain bounds of current doctrine can create
problems for states attempting to gauge the proper limits of their reg-
ulatory reach.
Such unpredictability is at least potentially a serious problem
because an absence of clear extraterritoriality standards can lead to
error in both directions. Thus, the danger is not merely that states
will be allowed to invade the legitimate interests of other states or
their citizens through extraterritorial legislation-because, as previ-
ously noted, a variety of pressures, including states' own interests in
15 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
16 See id. at 163-67.
17 Id. at 169.
18 See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 959 (N.D.
Cal. 2006) (summarizing case law rejecting Pataki).
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cooperation in various arenas, militate against such an outcome in
many cases. It is also the flip side of this concern: that courts will
unpredictably strike down certain acts of state regulation as extraterri-
torial even where such regulation is motivated by a defensible concern
for the in-state effects of out-of-state conduct.
II. THE COURTS' ROLE
Beyond my call for an integrated standard, most of my differ-
ences with Professor Rosen are small. Rosen suggests that primary
responsibility for formulating a set of extraterritoriality limits should
come not from courts but from Congress or the states themselves.' 9
He also recognizes, however, that courts have a valuable role both in
policing "egregious" instances of extraterritorial regulation and as
"first cut" responders in developing solutions to extraterritoriality
problems in the absence of congressional involvement.20 We do not
disagree. Some congressional involvement, certainly, is both part of
the constitutional scheme and, at least in some situations, desirable.
(The fact that at least one prong of extraterritoriality restrictions rests
on the dormant Commerce Clause certainly suggests that, at the very
least, Congress has the same power to override judicial decisions in
this area as it does in other dormant Commerce Clause situations.2 1 )
At the same time, it is open to question whether Congress is the actor
best suited either to formulating extraterritoriality principles or to
fleshing out how they should be applied in what are often highly indi-
vidual and fact-specific contexts. Even more important, to the extent
that constitutional provisions such as the Due Process Clause do pro-
vide outer limits on states' power to regulate extraterritorially, it is
important that such limits be meaningful and clear. That sub-consti-
tutional devices may, in many situations, prevent extraterritoriality
issues from arising in the first place does not obviate the need for a
clear understanding of constitutional standards in situations where
those mechanisms have broken down.
19 See Rosen, supra note 1, at 1139-41.
20 See id. at 1150-51.
21 It is worthy of note, however, that some commentators have seen the Edgar line
of cases as rooted in constitutional concerns transcending the dormant Commerce
Clause context. See, e.g., Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legisla-
tion, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1865, 1894-95 (1987).
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CONCLUSION
My proposal to integrate and reconcile the current extraterritori-
ality standards is a relatively modest one. In suggesting that we can
most profitably address the problem of extraterritoriality by recogniz-
ing correspondences between the regulatory acts of state legislatures
and the choice-of-law decisions of state courts, I have not attempted to
wrestle with the question of what the substantive outer limits of what
states' extraterritorial powers should be, including the much-debated
question (on which Professor Rosen has been one of the most
thoughtful voices to weigh in) of whether states do and should have
the power to regulate the conduct of their own citizens beyond state
borders.22 Further, my proposal does not attempt to resolve the
exclusivity vs. concurrence debate (though the standard for which I
tentatively advocate, which would give more consideration to in-state
effects than does the current regime, would certainly recognize that
more than one state may have a legitimate interest in regulating
behavior in certain circumstances). 23 Finally, my proposal is not
aimed at expanding the role of courts beyond that they have currently
assumed in moderating extraterritoriality disputes. It is not that
courts are always the best actors in policing the extraterritoriality
arena; it is simply that, to the extent they have a role, it should be
sensibly and coherently defined. And that, as I see it, is the real area
in which current doctrine could benefit from reform.
22 See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, "Hard" or "Soft" Pluralism?: Positive, Normative, and Insti-
tutional Considerations of States' Extraterritorial Powers, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 713, 731-38
(2007).
23 It might be argued, in fact, that the current drift of extraterritoriality doctrine
is back toward exclusivity in some respects. This is particularly true in the recent
punitive damages cases, as with the Supreme Court's statement in State Farm Mutual
Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), that, in assessing whether punitive
damages should be granted for non-Utah conduct to non-Utah residents, "the Utah
courts, in the usual case, would need to apply the laws of [those parties'] relevant
jurisdiction." Id. at 421-22; see also Florey, supra note 2, at 1095-98 (discussing such
cases). A reevaluation of extraterritoriality principles might in fact help moderate
this trend.
1162 [VOL. 85-3
